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Abstract—This paper analyzes loss of separation scenarios
when an Unmanned Aircraft (UA) enters in conflict with a
much faster airplane flying at the same altitude. Separation
distances are analyzed in terms of minimum heading changes
and reaction times. Results show that maneuvers need to be
performed well in advance if the (low-speed) UA is the aircraft
that changes its heading. In some cases the time in which the
UA and the intruder are in conflict could be too long, and may
even involve multiple airliners flying over the same airway. Given
that standard separation strategies may have a negative impact
on the UA mission, in this paper a set of pre-planned separation
maneuvers are proposed. These maneuvers aim to improve the
situational awareness of both air traffic controller and UA pilot-
in-command, but also to disrupt as less as possible the mission
performed by the UA and to minimize the uncertainty in the
reactions the UA may adopt autonomously if the link with the
ground station is lost. Some preliminary real-time simulations
are shown, using a UA ground station simulator linked to a air
traffic control simulator.
I. INTRODUCTION
In civil aviation, several layered mechanisms are present
to minimize the probability of collision with other aircraft.
Generally speaking, they are categorized into two main func-
tionalities: separation assurance and collision avoidance. Sepa-
ration assurance aims at keeping minimum distances between
the aircraft and potential intruders. A loss of separation is
considered a serious issue and ideally, it should never occur.
Nevertheless, a collision avoidance functionality can prevent
an imminent collision in case of a loss of separation as a last
resort maneuver. In manned aviation, some Airborne Collision
Avoidance Systems (ACAS) are already implemented and
installed in civil aircraft, such as the TCAS (Traffic Collision
Avoidance System). Moreover, regarding today’s developed
Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems, the Short Term Conflict
Alert (STCA) system can also alert the Air Traffic Control
operator (ATCo) of short term potentially conflicting flight
paths. The STCA is not intended to be a separation assurance
tool and like its airborne counterpart (the ACAS), it is used
as an additional safety net [1].
Several other collision avoidance models, ranging from
abstract concepts to prototype systems being evaluated or used
in laboratories, have also been proposed aiming at increasing
levels of automation in air traffic conflict detection and reso-
lution (see [2] for a review on this topic). These algorithms
typically compute the future position of the aircraft based on
projections of the current aircraft states into the future. The
performance of these algorithms is rapidly degraded if the
time horizon of the prediction increases, due to the inherent
uncertainties in aircraft flight paths. Nevertheless, since colli-
sion avoidance is considered as a last resort maneuver, these
detection times can be sufficiently small to still achieve good
results in the predictions. Obviously, the same methodology
cannot be applied for separation assurance purposes.
Nowadays, separation in controlled airspace is typically
responsibility of the ATC, which issue clearances to the
aircraft in order to maintain minimum separation values. Some
systems, however, have already been proposed to increase
the automation levels of these manual separation assurance
processes. For example, as an ATCo support tool, the Medium
Term Collision Detection (MTCD) system computes initially
the trajectory of the aircraft from the flight plan using perfor-
mance parameters and meteorological information and then,
refines it by monitoring the actual performance of the aircraft
[3]. Similar concepts are brought at cockpit level with the
Airborne Separation Assurance Systems (ASAS), which aim
to delegate separation tasks from controllers to pilots [4].
Furthermore, SESAR and NextGen programs propose new
paradigms that rely on accurate design and execution of four-
dimensional trajectories that are expected to transition from
radar control to trajectory-based operations. The accuracy
of these 4D systems, however, must rely on aircraft intent
information. Otherwise future flight paths can not be deduced
with certainty from only past flight path information, current
state vectors or by extrapolating (even with error free) the
information of those state vectors [5].
During the last decade, the interest of using Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) for civil missions and applications has
increased significantly [6], [7]. Yet, the lack of a regulation ba-
sis concerning their certification, airworthiness and operations
is still banning them into non-segregated airspace [8]. Among
all UAS possible applications, surveillance missions will be
perhaps the most numerous [9]. In these missions, UAS will
not operate as current commercial aircraft, that fly point-to-
point missions. They will possibly loiter over certain areas
performing all kinds of non-conventional flight plans (such
as scans, perimeter loops, etc.) that will change dynamically
during the flight, according to the mission needs. Moreover,
most of the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) will have poorer flight
performance than commercial airliners (in terms of cruise
speed and climb/descent performance, for instance), but will
likely operate at very similar altitudes. Finally, the a loss of
data-link situation with the UA must also be considered and,
depending on several parameters (such as the UAS particular-
ities, the type of airspace, the distribution of populated areas
below the flight path, etc.), this data-link lost contingency will
be handled in a way or another.
For all these reasons, the conflict detection and resolution
functionality can become an issue in a real UAS implemen-
tation. While extensive research has been devoted to collision
avoidance algorithms that take into account the particularities
of UAS, most of them inheriting from robotics and control
theory applications [10]–[16]; few researchers have addressed
the separation problem for UAS. Some proposals indeed,
implement separation minima in their algorithms (like for
instance [11]), but they are in general focused in very small
UA and typical separation values are in the order of meters.
Yet, if bigger UA are expected to fly into non-segregated
airspace, larger separation values (such as 5 NM) will have
to be considered [17].
This paper focuses on separation maneuvers for UAS and
analyzes a simple case where a UAS enters in conflict with
a much faster airplane flying at the same altitude. Differ-
ent requirements are analyzed in terms of heading changes
and minimum reaction times in order to maintain separation
between both aircraft, assuming that the intentions of both
are known. Since today’s standard separation strategies may
have a negative impact on the mission, implying a deviation
from the desired surveillance track, in this paper we pro-
pose pre-planned separation maneuvers. They aim to improve
the situational awareness of both ATCo and UAS pilot-in-
command, but also to disrupt as less as possible the sequence
of the mission performed by the UAS and to minimize the
uncertainty in the reactions the UA may adopt autonomously,
in case the link with the ground station is lost.
II. CONFLICT GEOMETRY EVALUATION
Separation between manned aircraft has been achieved in
controlled airspace by ATCo1, with strict flight plan adherence
rules and continuous monitoring of conservative safety vol-
umes around each aircraft. In this way, potential violations of
these volumes can be detected and ATCo can request aircraft
trajectory adjustments, usually issued by voice commands.
This manual process may take from tens of seconds to
minutes depending on the performance of the communications,
surveillance and navigation equipments, the workload of the
ATCo and the aircraft crew, etc. Given all these parameters,
minimum separation distances can be determined.
Controllers know beforehand the flight plan of the aircraft
and/or ask the aircraft crew for position reports. With this
information, they can figure out the different aircraft future
positions. Vertical separation between two aircraft is typically
1000 ft (or 2000 ft above a certain altitude). If no radar is
available, procedural control is applied and horizontal separa-
tion values can range up to 80 NM in some situations. On the
1In non-controlled airspace, separation is assured by applying see and avoid
rules [18].
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Fig. 1. Conflict geometry.
other hand, if radar control is possible the minimum separation
horizontal distance can be reduced to 5.0 NM, or even 3.0 NM
when radar capabilities at a given terminal area so permit [17].
One of the most important factors when detecting and
solving a separation conflict, is the relative flight performance
between the conflicting aircraft. With the possible introduc-
tion of UAS into civil non-segregated airspace, separation
conflicts between UA and conventional airliners may occur.
Such conflict geometries need to take into account the notable
differences in flight performance between the UA and such an
intruder. It might happen that changing the UA flight level, in
order to maintain separation, would not be a possible solution
due to the poor climbing or descending performance of the
UA at cruise altitudes. Similarly, changing the UA heading
will have to be executed well in advance if the UA is flying
at a speed significantly slower than the intruder.
This section evaluates a number of simple conflict scenarios
between a typical MALE UA (a GA MQ-9 Reaper2) and a
jet airliner intruder, assuming that both aircraft will remain
at the same altitude and that separation will be guaranteed
by changing the heading of one of the aircraft. Minimum
separation values of 3.0 NM and 5.0 NM are retained in
the following simulations. Furthermore, since UAS operations
might be subject to higher separation minima (to consider,
for instance, latency issues, lost-of-link emergencies, etc.), we
have also considered a hypothetical separation of 10 NM as
illustrative example of an increased radar separation value.
A. Conflict and aircraft performance models
Figure 1 summarizes the conflict geometry studied in this
paper. One aircraft (typically the airliner) is located in point
A. We assume that it is flying at a constant speed (v) and
altitude. At the same time, the second aircraft (typically the
UA) is placed at point B. We will also consider that it is
flying at a constant speed (u) and the same altitude than the
other one. Both aircraft are moving towards the same position
(point C). Points A and B are placed in such a way that both
aircraft will arrive to C at the same time. In order to avoid this
conflict we assume that the ATCo commands aircraft placed in
B to change its heading (∆h). We want to know which is the
2General Atomics Reaper performances are obtained from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/predatorb.htm
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Fig. 2. Forward conflict in which (a) the slowest aircraft performs a separation heading change and, (b) the fastest aircraft performs the heading change.
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Fig. 3. Forward conflict in which (a) the UAS performs a separation heading change and, (b) the intruder performs the heading change.
minimum absolute distance between both aircraft dsep, along
their flight paths, as a function of ∆h. We still have a degree
of freedom to place points A and B: the Time to Conflict (tc).
This time is defined as the amount of time elapsed between
the instant the aircraft changes its heading, in order to start
the separation maneuver, and the time that both aircraft would
have meet if no heading changes were applied (i.e. the time
when both aircraft reach point C).
Regarding to the performance model, only the speed of each
aircraft (at the considered altitude) has been taken into account.
Table I summarizes them.
Aircraft Model Speed
Airbus A320 u = 500kt
Boeing B737 w = 470kt
General Atomics Predator-B v = 170kt
TABLE I
AIRCRAFT MODELS AND SPEEDS CONSIDERED
Another aspect that has to be taken into account is which
plane is going to execute the heading correction in order to
maintain separation. According to the conflict geometry, if we
want to maximize the minimum absolute distance between
the aircraft, we have to minimize their relative speed. When
the aircraft speeds are similar, it makes no difference which
aircraft performs the separation maneuver. Conversely, when
the speeds are not similar, ATCo will achieve better results for
the same ∆h, if the fastest aircraft deviated from its flight path
rather than the slowest one. Yet, it is worth assuming that in the
future manned commercial aircraft might have higher priority
than the UAS when facing conflicting trajectories. Thus, in
this paper, we analyze both cases and either the UA or the
intruder can change its heading to avoid the conflict.
B. Forward separation conflicts
We define a forward conflict as a particular case of the
conflict model, when β = 180o. In this case, each aircraft will
move towards each other with the maximum possible relative
speed for the v and u considered before.
An example of this scenario is shown in Figures 2 and 3.
In Figure 2, the conflicting aircraft are the Airbus A320 and
the Boeing 737, which have similar cruise speeds. On the
other hand, in Figure 3, the Boeing 737 has been replaced
with the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper UA, with a much
lower cruise speed. For both Figures, β is fixed to 180o
and the plot on the left exposes the simulation results when
the slowest aircraft performs the separation heading change.
Conversely, the plot on the right exposes the same situation
but now, is the fastest aircraft who performs the separation
maneuver. In the x-axis ∆h has been plotted while, in the
y-axis, the minimum absolute distance between aircraft is
depicted. Each line represents a different Time to Conflict tc,
which is discretized in steps of 1 minute, from 2 to 10 minutes.
As expected, the lower tc, the lower minimum separation
distance achieved for a given ∆h. As exposed before, while
plots of Figure 2 are similar, the ones of Figure 3 differ
significantly. Therefore, in the last case, there are clear differ-
ences in the results depending on who performs the separation
assurance maneuver when aircraft speeds are dissimilar. For
example, in Figure 3, if aircraft are situated at tc = 5 minutes
from the conflict point and the reaction maneuver is defined
by ∆h = 20o, the minimum achieved separation distance is
14 NM or 5 NM depending on who performs the maneuver.
Therefore, there is a relative difference on separation factor of
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Fig. 4. Backward conflict in which (a) the UAS performs a separation heading change and, (b) the intruder performs the heading change.
2.8 for this particular case. However, in Figure 2, the minimum
achieved separation distance is 14.47 NM or 13.6 NM with a
factor of only 1.06.
Table II summarizes the minimum ∆h needed to ensure
lateral separation minima for several Times to Conflict (tc).
∆h values range from 5o to 90o in steps of 5o. If we compare
both tables, the differences in the results depending on who
performs the separation assurance maneuver become clearer.
For instance, if a lateral separation of 5NM is needed to
be ensured and the conflict has been detected 5 minutes in
advance, a minimum heading change of 25o is necessary if
the ATCo commanded the UAS to perform the separation
maneuver. Conversely, only a minimum heading change of
10o is necessary if ATCo commands the airliner.
Separation
Minima
∆h for the UAS ∆h for the intruder
tc [minutes] tc [minutes]
2 5 10 2 5 10
3 NM 35o 15o 10o 15o 5o 5o
5 NM 55o 25o 15o 20o 10o 5o
10 NM N/A 45o 25o 40o 15o 10o
TABLE II
MINIMUM ∆h TO ENSURE LATERAL SEPARATION (β = 180o)
C. Backward separation conflicts
We define a backward conflict as a particular case of the
conflict model, when β = 0o. In contrast to the previous case,
both aircraft have the same heading. The fastest aircraft will
move towards the slowest one, chasing it, with the minimum
possible relative speed. Figure 4 and Table III show the
simulation results for this case. As before, there is a clear
difference of results depending on which aircraft performs
the heading change. Nevertheless, the differences are less
important. For instance, if a lateral separation of 10 NM is
needed, and the conflict has been detected 10 minutes in
advance, a minimum heading change of 25o is necessary if
the ATCo commanded the UAS to perform the separation
maneuver. Conversely, only a minimum heading change of
10o is necessary if the ATCo commands the airliner.
Unlike forward conflicts, some conflict geometries become
unsolvable if ATCo commands the UA to perform the separa-
tion maneuver. That means that the minimum separation dis-
tance between both aircraft cannot be achieved. For instance, if
tc = 2 minutes (the typical STCA look ahead time) and if the
separation maneuver is performed by the UAS, the minimum
absolute distance cannot be more than 4 NM. In other words,
if a separation distance of 5 NM has to be ensured, a Time to
Conflict of 2 minutes is not enough regardless the ∆h value
(if the UA to performs the separation maneuver).
Separation
Minima
∆h for the UAS ∆h for the intruder
tc [minutes] tc [minutes]
2 5 10 2 5 10
3 NM 40o 15o 5o 15o 5o 5o
5 NM N/A 25o 15o 20o 10o 5o
10 NM N/A N/A 25o 50o 15o 10o
TABLE III
MINIMUM ∆h TO ENSURE LATERAL SEPARATION (β = 0o)
D. Lateral conflicts
We define a lateral conflict as any oblique conflict geometry
( β 6= 0o 6= 180o). As an illustrative example, simulation
results for β = 90o are depicted in Figure 5. Note that for
any oblique conflict geometries y-axis symmetry disappears.
Therefore, depending on the conflict geometry, turning left
will be better than turning right or vice versa for a given ∆h.
Table IV shows the minimum ∆h to ensure a specific lateral
separation minima, assuming that the ATCo commanded air-
craft turns in the direction that minimizes the required ∆h. As
expected, the required ∆h is lower than the backward conflict
geometry but higher than the forward case.
Summing up, two points have to be taken into account
when the speed of two conflicted aircraft are dissimilar. On
one hand, it is always better to resolve the conflict in terms
of maximization of the minimum absolute separation distance
when the fastest aircraft performs the heading change. On the
other hand, the minimum absolute distance is strongly related
with the conflict geometry, being the worst case the backward
one.
III. UAS ORIENTED SEPARATION MANEUVERS
As discussed in the previous section, separation conflicts
between a UA and an airliner can be better solved if the last
performs the heading change. Yet, if the Time to Conflict (tc)
is big enough, the separation can be totally assured by means
of changing the UA heading. There are scenarios where this
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Fig. 5. Lateral conflict in which (a) the UAS performs a separation heading change and, (b) the intruder performs the heading change.
Separation
Minima
∆h for the UAS ∆h for the intruder
tc [minutes] tc [minutes]
2 5 10 2 5 10
3 NM 55o 30o 15o 15o 10o 5o
5 NM 85o 40o 25o 25o 10o 5o
10 NM N/A 70o 40o 35o 15o 10o
TABLE IV
MINIMUM ∆h TO ENSURE LATERAL SEPARATION (β = 90o)
aspect becomes important, such as backward conflicts, when,
instead of having only one airliner chasing the UA, we could
have several ones that follow the same airway. In this case,
it will be easier for the ATCo to command a single heading
change to the UA than several commands to all the pursuers.
Therefore, it becomes necessary to design UA specific sepa-
ration maneuvers not only from the geometric point of view,
but also from the UAS pilot and ATCo operational situation
awareness. This section presents some maneuvers, specific for
UAS operations considering both en-route and UAS mission
flight phases.
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Fig. 6. Proposed separation maneuver for backward conflict geometry.
For the en-route flight phase, and from a geometric point
of view, the best way to obtain a minimum lateral separation
distance dmin is to change the UA heading in such a way that
the minimum separation distance is maximized (in this way,
the minimum separation value is achieved as soon as possible):
∆hopt = arg(max
∆h
dmin(∆h)) ; ∆h ∈ [−90o, 90o] (1)
For instance, in a forward conflict geometry, ∆hopt = ±90o
and for a backward geometry, ∆hopt = ±65o (see Figures 3
and 4 respectively).
Figure 6 depicts the whole separation maneuver regarding
to a backward conflict geometry. At the time that the conflict
B1
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Fig. 7. Modified separation maneuver for backward conflict geometry.
is detected, the UA is located at A point while the airliner is
at B. ATCo commands UA to change its heading ±∆hopt.
At t = t1 the UA will arrive to point D, where the lateral
separation dsep is guaranteed. Then, the UA will adapt its
trajectory to fly a parallel track with respect to the airliner
up to the point that both aircraft have the same x-coordinate
(t = t2). The airliner will be in point G and the UA in point
E, assuring the minimum lateral separation dsep. Then, the
UA will keep the same bearing for a buffer safety time (text)
before returning to the original flight plan changing its heading
to ∆h′.
From an operational point of view, as the suggested ma-
neuver is pre-planned and known beforehand by the ATC and
UAS crew, the situational awareness of both ATCo and UAS
pilot-in-command can be significantly improved. Moreover, as
the UA is flying in a parallel track with respect to its original
flight plan, the negative impact on the missions, in terms of
extra distance flown, is mitigated. Let us define ∆t = t2 − t1
as the time that the UA flies in this parallel track. From
an operational point of view ∆t should be bounded to a
maximum value. Qualitatively speaking, any ∆t resulting from
the scenario shown in Figure 6 could be accepted. However, in
a scenario with several intruders following the same airway,
∆t and therefore, the absolute distance between D and E,
could be bigger than desirable.
For this reason, the maneuver depicted in Figure 6 is
redefined and a holding pattern for the UA is inserted at the
end of the parallel separation track. This hold is defined with
a Hold to a Fix (HF) RNAV waypoint located at point E, a
hold inbound track parallel to the original UA track and with
the outbound holding track on the outer side of the maneuver
(see Figure 7). In this way, ∆t can be bound to a specific
value (depending on the scenario, UA performances,...) and
pre-negotiated with the ATC. If the UAS predicts that the
required time in the parallel track is higher than this maximum
value, the holding pattern is executed with as many iterations
as necessary. As explained before, this strategy would be
particularly useful when several intruders are present and the
UA can not return to its original flight plan until the conflict
with the last intruder is cleared.
In the mission phase, once the separation point D is reached,
turning back into the opposite direction may be better in terms
of mission disruption. There are several mission tasks (e.g.
surveillance, remote sensing, ...) where flying a specific track
is crucial for mission results and therefore, the UA cannot
simply skip a portion of the flight plan. Figure 8 shows this
mission separation maneuver.
y
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Fig. 8. Modified separation maneuver for backward conflict geometry in
mission stage.
Summing up, if en-route, the UAS would prefer to keep its
initial heading, as it will take the UA closer to its destination.
However, if performing surveillance, any area not overflown
due to the separation maneuver will need to be re-explored
after the conflict is cleared. In this way, a backtrack trajectory
may allow the UAS to easily reinsert back into its original
surveillance track, minimizing the negative impact of the
maneuver. Moreover, in the case that multiple intruders appear
in sequence the UAS may retain its separation position for
longer time by performing a hold pattern that keeps the desired
separation with the original track. Hold pattern can be repeated
as long as necessary, and it is compatible with both types
of maximum separation maneuvers (forward / rear facing
separation maneuver).
IV. REAL-TIME SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
A simulation tool called ISIS has been developed to evaluate
multiple aspects of the integration of UAS in non-segregated
airspace [19]. ISIS is currently coupled with the X-Plane
flight simulation environment, including two UA models based
on NASA’s Predator-B and Global Hawk (currently used in
scientific missions). In order to evaluate the dynamic be-
havior of the UAS and support UAS-ATC interaction, the
simulation environment is integrated with Eurocontrol’s eDEP
(Early Demonstration and Evaluation Platform) through the
interchange of ADS-B messages.
eDEP 3 is a low-cost, lightweight, web-enabled ATC simu-
lator platform, offering an environment for rapid prototyping
3http://www.eurocontrol.fr/projects/edep/
applications. eDEP includes the core platform functions for
airspace management, flight plan preparation, flight manage-
ment, trajectory prediction, coordination services and flight
path monitoring, and provides an EATMP compliant controller
working position (CWP), and a graphical pilot working posi-
tion (PWP); etc. Operational simulations have been conducted
by employing traffic available from Eurocontrol.
Within this simulation environment a complete UAS-based
surveillance mission is being developed, covering all aspects
related to the UAS departure, en-route, mission, arrival, and
in-flight contingencies. Figure 9 depicts the main flight plan
management interface in which the current UAS flight plan can
be tracked, as well as selected parameters updated. The inter-
face also allows to graphically explore contingency alternatives
and separation maneuver in real-time. The flight plan depicted
in Figure 9 describes a surveillance operation that departs
and returns from LEBL and performs an extensive scanning
operation over the Pyrenees range. The mission follows an
iterative scheme that starts with a holding operation near the
surveillance area. Once ATC clearances are obtained, the UAS
starts a repetitive scanning operation that returns to the holding
area awaiting for the command to repeat another scan or the
command to return to LEBL.
Conflicts generated due to the insertion of the simulated
UAS into the European airspace while being simulated by
eDEP can be seen in Figure 10. The UAS awareness system
(on the right) detects the intruder through the incoming ADS-
B messages so that the best suited separation maneuver can
be selected. At the same time, the ATCo position in eDEP (on
the left) permits to visualize the development of the separation
conflict using both the tactical and strategic tools typically
available to them. According to the separation conflict, the
pilot may command a heading change (requested by the ATCo)
or propose the maximum separation maneuver discussed in
previous sections.
ISIS (see Figure 11) includes an HMI interface designed
to support the separation maneuver selection. The pilot can
preview two different maneuvers at the same time and update
their parameters in real time. Once a maneuver is selected
it must be committed so that the UAS executes it and later
returns to the nominal flight plan. Flight time estimation is
also computed so that the geometry of the separation conflict
can be re-evaluated. Both forward and backward separation
maneuvers are available. Maximum separation, dimensions
of the holding pattern, number of iterations (from 0 to N),
right/left turn, and altitude change can be tailored to the
separation requirements. The geometry any selected maneuver
and the incoming conflict is recomputed every second so that
the pilot may have enough time and information to properly
evaluate the situation and react to ATC requests. As seen in
Figure 10, the interface offers information about the conflicting
traffic, the area in which the intrusion will occur given the
intentions of both aircraft, and predictions of the committed
separation maneuver.
The execution of both types of separation maneuvers is
shown in Figure 11. Both trajectories perform the preplanned
Fig. 9. Screenshot of the Flight Plan Management interface in the USAL architecture. The depicted flight plan is used as an example and represents a typical
fire surveillance mission over the Pyrenees range, departing from Barcelona’s airport (LEBL).
Fig. 10. Separation conflict and maneuver as seen in both eDEP and ISIS.
maximum separation turn that it is immediately sequenced
with a single iteration racetrack. Once completed, the back-
wards maneuver re-inserts the UAS in the original track, while
the forward facing maneuver re-inserts the UAS much latter
in the flight plan.
The soundness of the concept is currently being evaluated
through the generation of a significant number of simulation
scenarios that will include different UA speeds, turning ca-
pabilities, conflicting angles pilot reaction time and amount
of traffic. The objective is to gather experimental data to
fully understand the limitations and impact that the proposed
maneuvers may have on both the UA pilot, the ATCo and
the surrounding traffic. Realistic scenarios are being currently
implemented so that experienced ATCo’s could be confronted
with them and complete the evaluation process.
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
Achieving continual safe separation distances between all
aircraft is a critical requirement for integrating UAS and
manned aircraft within controlled and uncontrolled airspace.
This paper has evaluated simple conflict scenarios between
a MALE UA and a jet airliner intruder, when both aircraft
remain at the same altitude and separation is guaranteed by
changing the heading of only one of both aircraft. Results show
that the minimum horizontal separation distance is strongly
dependent to the relative velocity between the conflicting
aircraft. Given that the cruise airspeeds differences between
airliners and UA are huge, we have determined that separation
(if executed by the UA) needs to be executed much more
in advance and more aggressively than currently employed
vectoring-based maneuvers.
Based on this result, the paper has introduced a set of
Fig. 11. Forward and backwards separation maneuvers as seen in the ISIS simulation environment.
pre-planned separation maneuvers to be employed by the
UA. These maneuvers can guarantee the maximum separation
rate while minimizing the negative impact on a hypothetical
surveillance mission of the UAS. These soundness of the
concept has been validated in a real-time simulation envi-
ronment that combines a detailed UA operation with a air
traffic simulation environment. Initial experiments indicate the
feasibility of the concept, although additional experiments
need to be developed in order to determine the real impact
of the UA’s performance, the workload for the ATCo and the
potential impact on surrounding traffic.
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